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______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge. 
 In these two appeals, we are called upon to resolve the 
alleged tension between the sentencing statutes and the 
Sentencing Guidelines. Andre Ware and Allen Stratton, both 
serving sentences for various offenses involving crack 
cocaine, each moved in their respective cases for reductions 
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in their sentences following a retroactive amendment to the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines applicable to crack cocaine 
offenses.
1
   
District Court Judge Dubois, presiding over Ware‟s 
case, granted his motion and reduced his sentence from 128 
months to 84 months. District Court Judge Yohn, presiding 
over Stratton‟s case, denied his motion to reduce his sentence 
from 188 months.  The government appealed in Ware‟s case. 
Stratton appealed from his sentence in his case.  
Both cases present the same issue: whether the 
Sentencing Guidelines amendments at issue apply to 
defendants who, like Ware and Stratton, were originally 
sentenced on the basis of variances (Ware) or departures 
(Stratton) from a guideline range not affected by the 
amendments.  We hold that the Sentencing Guidelines 
amendments do not. Thus, we will reverse the District Court 
in Ware‟s case and affirm the District Court in Stratton‟s 
case. 
I 
 In August 2009, Andre Ware was convicted of several 
drug offenses involving crack cocaine.  His initial offense 
                                              
1
 Both Ware and Stratton were street-level drug dealers. 
Ware‟s conviction included counts of conspiracy to possess 
crack cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of crack 
with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school. Ware 
was found to be responsible for 1.17 grams of crack. Stratton 
was convicted on counts including distribution of crack 
cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and possession with 
intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school. He was 
found responsible for 5.9 grams of crack. 
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level under the Sentencing Guidelines was 18, and his 
criminal history category was VI.  Because Ware qualified as 
a career offender, his offense level was adjusted to 34, and his 
criminal history category remained VI.  Under that level and 
category, the guideline range for Ware‟s sentence was 262 
months to 327 months‟ imprisonment.  At sentencing, the 
District Court indicated that it felt that this range was too high 
and granted a downward variance, sentencing him to 128 
months‟ imprisonment. 
 In 2010, the Sentencing Commission promulgated an 
amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines that, effective 
November 1, 2011, reduced the base offense levels for crack 
cocaine offenses by increasing the weight of drugs associated 
with each offense level. U.S.S.G., App. C, amd. 750. 
Simultaneously, the Commission also promulgated a further 
amendment, Amendment 759, also effective November 1, 
2011, adding the relevant portions of Amendment 750 to the 
list of amendments that may trigger a retroactive sentence 
reduction. In the course of making these amendments, the 
Commission also modified the Commentary to its policy 
statement governing the retroactive application of Guidelines 
amendments.  The amended Commentary specifies: 
. . . Eligibility for consideration under 18 U.S.C. 
3582(c)(2) is triggered only by an amendment 
listed in subsection (c) that lowers the 
applicable guideline range (i.e., the guideline 
range that corresponds to the offense level and 
criminal history category determined pursuant 
to 1B1.1(a), which is determined before 
consideration of any departure provision in the 
Guidelines Manual or any variance). . . . 
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U.S.S.G. §1B1.10 cmt. 1(A).  
In 2011, Ware moved for a reduction in his sentence 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
2
 Ware argued before the 
District Court that he was eligible for a sentence reduction 
notwithstanding the fact that under the amended Guidelines 
Commentary his “applicable guidelines range” was 
determined by his career offender status, precluding him 
from qualifying for a reduction. Specifically, Ware contended 
that the Guidelines Commentary is invalid and therefore not 
binding because it directly conflicts with § 3582(c)(2). 
District Court Judge Dubois agreed, concluding that “[t]o the 
extent that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10‟s Application Notes 
Commentary prohibits the Court from reducing [Ware]‟s 
sentence, it is incompatible with 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court [in Freeman v. United 
States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 180 L. Ed. 2d 519  (2011)] and is 
invalid.”  Judge Dubois further concluded that a reduction in 
Ware‟s sentence was consistent with the purposes of both 
Congress and the Sentencing Commission and reduced his 
sentence to 84 months. As noted, the government appealed. 
II 
 In December 2000, Allen Stratton was convicted of 
several drug offenses involving crack cocaine.  His initial 
offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines was 32, and his 
initial criminal history category was IV.  Because Stratton 
qualified as a career offender, however, his criminal history 
category was adjusted to VI, and his adjusted offense level 
was 37.  Under that level and category, the guideline range 
                                              
2
 See text, infra Part III.   
 
7 
 
for Stratton‟s sentence was 360 months to life imprisonment.  
At sentencing, Judge Yohn indicated that he felt that this 
range was too high and granted a downward departure for 
over-representation of criminal history, thereby reducing 
Stratton‟s offense level to 34 and his criminal history 
category to V.  Under this calculation, Stratton faced a 
guideline range of 235-293 months. Judge Yohn sentenced 
him to 240 months. 
 In 2008, following a 2007 amendment to the 
Sentencing Guidelines reducing the offense level for crack 
cocaine offenses, U.S.S.G., App. C, amd. 706, Stratton filed a 
motion under § 3582(c)(2) for a reduction in sentence, which 
was granted, reducing his term to 188 months. 
In 2011, Stratton filed another motion for a reduction 
in his sentence in light of Amendment 750. As Ware did, 
Stratton argued that the Guidelines Commentary precluding 
his receiving a reduction is invalid because it directly 
conflicts with § 3582(c)(2). Judge Yohn disagreed and 
determined that Stratton was not eligible for a reduction in 
sentence under § 1B1.10. Stratton appealed. 
III 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over both cases 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 Ordinarily, we review a District Court determination 
on a motion for a § 3582(c)(2) reduction of sentence for abuse 
of discretion.  Because this case raises a purely legal question 
concerning the interpretation and legal status of § 3582(c)(2) 
and the related policy statement by the Sentencing 
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Commission, however, our review is plenary.  United States 
v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009). 
Before addressing the arguments before us, we briefly 
outline the relevant statutory and Guidelines sections. 
Section 3582(c)(2), under which both Ware and 
Stratton sought sentence reductions, provides that “in the case 
of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has 
subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . 
. upon motion of the defendant . . . the court may reduce the 
term of imprisonment . . . if such a reduction is consistent 
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission.” (Emphasis added.) The relevant Sentencing 
Commission policy statement, § 1B1.10(a)(1), in turn 
provides that, in general:  
In a case in which a defendant is serving a term 
of imprisonment, and the guideline range 
applicable to that defendant has subsequently 
been lowered as a result of an amendment to the 
Guidelines Manual [that is among those listed 
in § 1B1.10 (c)], the court may reduce the 
defendant‟s term of imprisonment as provided 
by 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). As required by 18 
U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), any such reduction in the 
defendant’s term of imprisonment shall be 
consistent with this policy statement. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Section 1B1.10(a)(2) contains the following exclusion 
to this general rule: “A reduction in the defendant‟s term of 
imprisonment is not consistent with this policy statement and 
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therefore is not authorized under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) if . . . 
[the amendment] does not have the effect of lowering the 
defendant’s applicable guideline range.” (Emphasis added.) 
Of particular salience to this appeal, Commentary to § 
1B1.10 further provides: “. . . Eligibility for consideration 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is triggered only by an 
amendment listed in subsection (c) that lowers the applicable 
guideline range (i.e., the guideline range that corresponds to 
the offense level and criminal history category determined 
pursuant to §1B1.1(a), which is determined before 
consideration of any departure provision in the Guidelines 
Manual or any variance). . . .” Section 1B1.10 cmt. 
1(A)(emphasis added.) The parenthetical explaining that 
“applicable guideline range” is to be calculated prior to any 
variance or departure was inserted into the Commentary as 
part of Amendment 759. 
All parties to these appeals agree that although 
Amendment 750 is a retroactive amendment as specified in § 
1B1.10 (c), the Commentary to § 1B1.10 precludes both 
Ware and Stratton from being eligible for sentence reductions 
under § 3582(c)(2).  Under the Commentary, the “applicable 
guideline range” for both would be the guideline range 
reflecting their career offender designations, which were not 
affected by Amendment 750.  Since the “applicable guideline 
range” was not lowered by Amendment 750, the Commentary 
makes clear that § 1B1.10 is inapplicable in these cases.  The 
dispositive issue in these appeals, therefore, is whether the 
Commentary to § 1B1.10 is binding on the District Court.  
IV 
 The Sentencing Commission is authorized, when it 
reduces the sentence for a given offense, to determine “in 
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what circumstances and by what amount the sentences of 
prisoners serving terms of imprisonment for the offense may 
be reduced.”  28 U.S.C. § 994(u).  The Supreme Court has 
recognized that through this statutory delegation “Congress 
has granted the Commission the unusual explicit power to 
decide whether and to what extent its amendments reducing 
sentences will be given retroactive effect.” Braxton v. United 
States, 500 U.S. 344, 348, 111 S. Ct. 1854, 1858, 114 L. Ed. 
2d 385 (1991)(emphasis in original). The Supreme Court has 
further recognized that as a result of this statutory delegation, 
“[a]mended commentary is binding on the federal courts even 
though it is not reviewed by Congress, and prior judicial 
constructions of a particular guideline cannot prevent the 
Commission from adopting a conflicting interpretation that 
satisfies the standard we set forth today.” Stinson v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 36, 46, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1919, 123 L. Ed. 2d 
598 (1993). Under the aforementioned standard, “provided an 
agency‟s interpretation of its own regulations does not violate 
the Constitution or a federal statute, it must be given 
„controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.‟” Id. at 508 U.S. 45, 113 S. 
Ct. 1919 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 
U.S. 410, 414, 65 S. Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945)). 
Thus, the Sentencing Commission‟s authority to restrict the 
retroactive effect of an amendment is circumscribed by the 
principle that when “the Commission‟s revised commentary 
is at odds with [a statute‟s] plain language . . . it must give 
way.”  United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997).  
Ware and Stratton contend that the Commentary in question 
conflicts with § 3582(c)(2) and must therefore “give way.” 
 The plain language of § 3582(c)(2) authorizing the 
court to reduce the sentence of a defendant who was 
sentenced “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently 
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been lowered by the Sentencing Commission” provided such 
a reduction is also “consistent with applicable policy 
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission” precludes 
Ware and Stratton‟s argument. As we have recognized, “[t]he 
plain language of § 3582(c)(2) requires that a sentence 
reduction be „consistent with applicable policy statements 
issued by the Sentencing Commission.‟ § 3582(c)(2). The 
plain language of the statute, therefore, specifically 
incorporates the Commission‟s policy statements . . . .” 
United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2009).  
In Doe, the defendants, who had been convicted of 
crack cocaine offenses and had been granted departures from 
their respective statutory mandatory minimum sentences for 
having assisted the government, contended that the District 
Court had improperly denied their § 3582(c)(2) motions for 
sentence reduction following a retroactive Guidelines 
amendment reducing the offense level for crack cocaine 
offenses. Doe claimed, inter alia, that the Guidelines policy 
statement precluding a reduction where an amendment “does 
not have the effect of lowering the defendant‟s applicable 
guideline range,” § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B), improperly reinterpreted 
the term “based on” in § 3582(c)(2) and did not control 
because it conflicted with the broader terms and 
congressional intent of § 3582(c)(2). We rejected Doe‟s 
premise that the Guidelines statement improperly redefined 
the statutory term “based on.” See United States v. Flemming, 
617 F.3d 252, 260 n. 11 (3d Cir. 2010), as amended (Sept. 27, 
2010). In so doing, we observed:  
Not only did Congress intend to incorporate the 
Commission‟s policy statements into § 
3582(c)(2), but the policy statement and § 
3582(c)(2) are complementary. The first prong 
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of § 3582(c)(2) requires that a defendant have 
been sentenced based on a sentencing range that 
has subsequently been lowered. The policy 
statement requires that the amendment must 
have actually had the effect of lowering the 
Guideline range. Although the policy statement 
is narrower, it certainly does not run contrary to 
§ 3582(c)(2).  
Doe, 564 F.3d at 310-11. For the same reasons articulated in 
Doe, the Commentary at issue in the present case, which 
elaborates upon which modifications will qualify as lowering 
the guideline range under the policy statement complements, 
rather than contradicts, the terms of § 3582(c)(2).  
 In reaching the opposite conclusion, Judge Dubois in 
Ware‟s case relied heavily on the United States Supreme 
Court‟s decision in Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
2685, 180 L. Ed. 2d 519 (2011), and Ware and Stratton 
likewise invoke Freeman as the ground for their argument on 
appeal.  This reliance is misplaced. In Freeman, the court 
interpreted § 3582(c)(2)‟s “based on” language to determine 
whether a defendant sentenced according to a plea agreement 
that recommended a particular sentence pursuant to Fed. R. 
Crim. Proc. 11(c)(1)(C) could be eligible for a sentence 
reduction under § 3582(c)(2). Justice Sotomayor, in a 
separate opinion that results in the court‟s holding, held that 
“if a [plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C)] expressly 
uses a Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the charged 
offense to establish the term of imprisonment, and that range 
is subsequently lowered by the United States Sentencing 
Commission, the term of imprisonment is „based on‟ the 
range employed and the defendant is eligible for sentence 
reduction under § 3582(c)(2).” Id. at 2695 (Sotomayor, J., 
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concurring).
3
 Ware and Stratton now claim that the 
Commentary to § 1B1.10 improperly defines “applicable 
guideline range” in a manner inconsistent with the “based on” 
language of § 3582(c)(2) as interpreted by Justice Sotomayor 
and the Supreme Court.   
As discussed previously, the Commentary at issue in 
these appeals does not present an interpretation of the 
statutory term “based on,” but rather presents an additional, 
complementary limit on sentences eligible for reduction 
pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). This limit is statutorily authorized 
by the requirement that a reduction be “consistent with 
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission.” The meaning of the term “based on” – and 
hence the holding of Freeman – is simply not germane to the 
present appeals.
4
 
                                              
3
 A plurality of the Justices concluded that the court could 
“revisit a prior sentence to whatever extent the sentencing 
range in question was a relevant part of the analytic 
framework the judge used to determine the sentence.”  
Freeman, 131 S.Ct. at 2692-93. Justice Sotomayor concurred 
in the judgment, but on narrower reasoning that would permit 
reduction only in a subset of cases reviewable under the 
plurality approach. Justice Sotomayor‟s narrower reasoning 
thus stands as the binding holding of the court. Marks v. 
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).  
4
 Moreover, Freeman was decided prior to the amendment of 
the Guidelines commentary that added the language at issue 
in these appeals. As we have recognized, § 3582(c)(2) 
expressly incorporates the Guidelines policies, and therefore 
modification of the relevant policies may affect the proper 
interpretation of the statute as a whole. It is clear, moreover, 
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 We also note that this conclusion is consistent with our 
recent opinions in United States v. Barney, 672 F.3d 228 (3d 
Cir. 2012), and United States v. Berberena, ___ F. 3d ___, 
2012 WL 3937666 (3d Cir. September 11, 2012). In Barney, 
which dealt with a separate provision of the Sentencing 
Guidelines and was decided after Amendment 759 took 
effect, we considered “what is the „applicable guideline 
range‟ for a career offender receiving a . . . departure under a 
post-2003 edition of the Guidelines.” Id. at 231. We 
concluded that there is “no doubt that a § 4A1.3 departure is a 
departure from the applicable guideline range, not a departure 
to the applicable guideline range.” Id. at 231-32 (emphasis in 
original).  The applicable guideline range, we reasoned, is 
“the range dictated by the Career Offender Guidelines, not 
[the post-] departure range.”  Id. at 232.  We further noted 
that this conclusion was consistent with Amendment 759.  Id. 
at 232 n.1. Neither Ware nor Stratton has articulated any 
meaningful distinction between the question presented in this 
                                                                                                     
that the Sentencing Commission may modify the Guidelines 
and associated commentary in a manner that abrogates prior 
judicial decisions, much as Congress may amend a statute 
previously interpreted by the courts. See Braxton, 500 U.S. at 
348, 111 S. Ct. at 1858 (declining to resolve circuit split 
regarding meaning of Guideline where Sentencing 
Commission was in process of amending Guideline in manner 
that would resolve conflict); Stinson, 508 U.S. 36, 46, 113 S. 
Ct. 1913, 1919 (“prior judicial constructions of a particular 
guideline cannot prevent the Commission from adopting a 
conflicting interpretation . . . “). Thus, even if the meaning of 
“based on” in the context of § 3582(c)(2) were at issue in the 
present appeals, Freeman would not be controlling.  
15 
 
case and the question previously resolved in Barney, nor are 
we aware of any such distinction.   
In Berberena we addressed several challenges to the 
Commission‟s authority to promulgate an amended policy 
statement to § 1B1.10 that generally prevented courts from 
reducing a defendant‟s sentence to a term less than the 
amended guideline range. Most relevant, we rejected 
Berberena‟s claim that the policy statement exceeded the 
Commission‟s statutory authority by intruding on judges‟ 
sentencing authority. In doing so, we noted that “the 
unfettered judicial discretion that Defendants seek to preserve 
is at odds with the narrow scope of § 3582(c)(2) sentence 
reduction proceedings.” Berberena,  ___ F. 3d at ___, 2012 
WL 3937666, at *5. 
We therefore conclude that the Sentencing 
Commission‟s Commentary defining “applicable guideline 
range” in such a manner as to exclude ranges determined as 
the result of variances and departures is not at odds and is not 
in conflict with the plain language of § 3582(c)(2) and is 
therefore binding on the District Courts.  As we have 
determined the Commentary at issue to be valid, Ware and 
Stratton were not entitled to reductions of their sentences.  
V 
 We will reverse the District Court‟s order entered on 
January 9, 2012 (our appeal no. 12-1330) granting Ware‟s 
motion for reduction of sentence, and we will affirm the 
District Court‟s order entered on February 28, 2012 (our 
appeal no. 12-1671) denying Stratton‟s motion for reduction 
of sentence. 
 
